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NOT IN MY FRONT YARD: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND STATE ACTION IN NEW YORK 
CITY’S PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC 
SPACES 
 
Stephen Tower* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Beginning on September 17, 2011, a protest group known as 
Occupy Wall Street (“Occupy”) took up residence in Zuccotti Park 
in downtown Manhattan, just a short walk from the New York 
Stock Exchange.1 This grassroots, leaderless movement sought to 
draw attention to the financial industry centered around New 
York’s Wall Street. The participants believed that the industry’s 
influence over the democratic process was responsible for the 
failures in regulation and policy that led to the recession of 2008.2 
Over time, Occupy grew to encompass many other causes, 
including “immoral and illegal wars,”3 collective bargaining rights 
for workers, and oppressive student debt. They used their 
continued presence in downtown Manhattan as a tool to draw 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A., University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst, 2006. I would like to thank my parents, Christine and 
Steve Tower for all their support and encouragement throughout the process of 
writing this Note. Thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for 
helping me through this process and making editing as painless as possible. 
Special thanks to all my friends for keeping me motivated, Occupy Wall Street 
for keeping me inspired, and the great city of Boston for ensuring that my heart 
never strays far from my roots.  
1 Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2011). 
2 Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied, NEW YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/11/28/111128fa_fact_schwartz. 
 3 THE NYC GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE DECLARATION OF THE OCCUPATION 
OF NEW YORK CITY 14 (2d ed. 2012). 
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attention to these various social issues.4  
On November 15 at 1:00 A.M., after Occupy’s nearly two 
month-occupation of Zuccotti Park, the New York Police 
Department (“N.Y.P.D.”) mounted a raid on the park. Police 
officers forcibly evicted the protesters camping there and arrested 
142 protestors who refused to leave.5 The following morning, in 
Waller v. City of New York, a New York Supreme Court judge 
denied a temporary restraining order against the eviction, finding 
that the permanent occupation of Zuccotti Park with tents and other 
equipment did not constitute First Amendment-protected speech.6 
Finding that the occupation of Zuccotti Park was not 
constitutionally protected speech enabled the court to sidestep 
another major issue raised by the late-night eviction: whether 
Zuccotti Park’s private owner could restrict the protestors’ speech 
and assembly.7  
Unlike Battery Park and Central Park, which are both publicly 
owned spaces,8 Zuccotti Park is a privately owned public space9 
owned by Brookfield Properties, Inc.10 Zuccotti Park was 
originally developed as a permanently public space as part of an 
incentive zoning scheme that granted developers leeway with 
height, floor-space, and setback restrictions11 if they made a 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 James Barron, City Reopens Park After Protesters Are Evicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-
begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html. 
6 See Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 545. 
7 Id. at 544. 
8 List of Parks, N.Y.C. PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.nycgovparks 
.org/park-features/parks-list?boro=M (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
9 “Privately Owned Public Spaces . . . are an amenity provided and 
maintained by a developer for public use, in exchange for additional floor 
area.” See Privately Owned Public Space, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/pops/pops_history.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
10 See Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 543. 
11 The Department of City Planning (“DCP”) defines a setback as “the 
portion of a building that is set back above the base height (or street wall or 
perimeter wall) before the total height of the building is achieved.” Zoning 
Glossary, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF BLDGS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/ 
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portion of their property open and accessible to the general 
public.12 Thus, while it remains open to the free use and enjoyment 
by the public, Zuccotti Park remains the private property of 
Brookfield Properties.  
Prior to Occupy, “the only visible rules posted in the park 
forbade skateboarding, rollerblading, and bicycling.”13 In response 
to Occupy, Brookfield Properties, instituted new policies that 
further limited the public’s use.14 After the protesters arrived in 
Zuccotti Park, Brookfield Properties instituted several new sets of 
regulations.15 These ranged from prohibitions on sleeping or lying 
down in the park to rules against using tents or tarps to construct 
dwellings in the park.16 After Occupy’s eviction in November 
2011, Brookfield enacted even stricter regulations, barring a 
number of items and activities, including large backpacks or 
suitcases, yoga mats, large amounts of food and beverages, musical 
instruments, books, serving food, and drumming.17 Additionally, 
for several months after Occupy was evicted from Zuccotti Park, 
                                                          
html/zone/glossary.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).   
12 Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Defendant at 9, People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (No. 
2011NY082981). 
13 Christian Salazaar, Zuccotti Park Barricades Removed: Occupy Wall 
Street Protesters Stream Back into Former Camp, HUFFINGTON  
POST (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/zuccotti-park-
barricades_n_1198129.html. 
14 Andrea Swalec, Zuccotti Park’s Rules: No Tents, No Tarps and No Lying 
Down, DNAINFO (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/ 
20111115/downtown/zuccotti-parks-rules-no-tents-no-tarps-no-lying-down. 
15 Rights Groups Urge City to Halt Illegal Restrictions at Zuccotti Park, 
N.Y.C.L.U. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.nyclu.org/news/rights-groups-urge-city-
halt-illegal-restrictions-zuccotti-park [hereinafter Rights Groups Urge City]. 
16 Colin Moynihan, At Least 4 Arrested at Zuccotti Park After Occupy 
March, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/12/a-least-3-arrested-at-zuccotti-park-after-occupy-march/. 
17 Colin Moynihan, Police Enforcing Unposted Rules at Zuccotti Park, 
Memo Indicates, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Aug. 6, 2012, 12:08 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/police-enforcing-unposted-rules-
at-zuccotti-park-memo-indicates/; Christopher Robbins, Sleepless in Zuccotti: 
Occupiers Confront New Park Regulations, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:13 
PM), http://gothamist.com/2011/11/16/sleepless_in_zuccotti_occupiers_fin.php. 
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steel barriers completely enclosed the park, and security forces 
tightly controlled access to the park.18 These guards only allowed 
visitors into or out of the public space via two security 
checkpoints, where guards searched visitors’ bags and containers.19 
Even after Brookfield Properties removed this permanent security 
wall in January 2012, any time Occupy Wall Street planned a large 
gathering at Zuccotti Park, including May Day and the 
movement’s six-month and one-year anniversaries, Brookfield re-
installed the same security fence and checkpoints.20 These actions 
demonstrate a clear pattern of intentionally discouraging the 
political activities of Occupy within Zuccotti Park by the park’s 
private owner. 
The constitutional restrictions that bind state actors, the 
government, or its agents, do not ordinarily bind private actors.21 
However, Section 1983 of the United States Code allows 
                                                          
18 Salazaar, supra note 13; City Removes Illegal Barriers at Zuccotti Park 
One Day After Rights Groups Send Threatening Letter, N.Y.C.L.U. (Jan. 10, 
2012), http://www.nyclu.org/news/city-removes-illegal-barriers-zuccotti-park-
one-day-after-rights-groups-send-threatening-letter; Nate Rawlings, Occupy 
Wall Street Branches Out After Regaining Its Home Base, TIME (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/01/12/occupy-wall-street-branches-out-after-
regaining-its-home-base/. 
19 Robbins, supra note 17; Rights Groups Urge City, supra note 15. 
20 See Sarah Berman, On #Occupy Anniversary in NYC, New Tactics on 
Both Sides of Police Barricades, TYEE (Sept. 17, 2012, 5:30 PM), 
http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Rights-Justice/2012/09/17/Occupy-
Anniversary/ (describing the security entrances through which visitors to 
Zuccotti Park had to pass); Chris Miles, Occupy Wall Street Retakes Zuccotti 
Park, Kicks Off 2012 Protests, POLICYMIC (Mar. 17, 2012), 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/5595/occupy-wall-street-retakes-zuccotti-
park-kicks-off-2012-protests (police respond to a protest marking the sixth 
month anniversary of the Occupy Wall Street movement); Steve Rhodes, Police 
and Barricades Surround Zuccotti Park in New York, DEMOTIX (Sept. 15, 
2012), http://www.demotix.com/photo/1451218/police-and-barricades-surround-
zuccotti-park-new-york (police erect barricades in anticipating of protests on the 
one year anniversary of Occupy Wall Street); Lynette Wilson, Trinity Wall 
Street Hosts May Day Teach-in: Occupy Protesters March on Zuccotti Park, 
EPISCOPAL NEWS SERV. (May 1, 2012), http://episcopaldigitalnetwork.com/ 
ens/2012/05/01/trinity-wall-street-hosts-may-day-teach-in/ (police preemptively 
barricade Zuccotti Park on news of a planned May Day Protest). 
21 Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 
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individuals, who have been deprived of their constitutional rights 
by actors who are acting under the authority of the state, to hold 
those actors liable.22 For instance, when a private actor performs a 
public function,23 becomes deeply entwined in the action of the 
state, or is specifically authorized and encouraged to act by the 
state, courts have found the private actor is acting with the 
authority of the state as its surrogate.24 In those cases, the action is 
treated by the court as an action of the state, and the otherwise 
private actor becomes subject to the same constitutional 
restrictions imposed on state actors.25 State and local governments 
                                                          
22 Section 1983 reads: 
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action 
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory 
relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any 
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. §1983 (2012). 
23 A private party performs a public function where it has “been delegated 
some authority by the state that is historically an ‘exclusive prerogative of the 
sovereign.’” Richard H.W. Maloy, “Under Color of”—What Does It Mean?, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 565, 600 (2005) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 
160 (1978)). 
24 Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of 
Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R.. L.J. 
203, 210 (2001). See also Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 
(1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991); 
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 
(1966).  
25 See VI. Public Space, Private Deed: The State Action Doctrine and 
Freedom of Speech on Private Property, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2010) 
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are barred from violating the bill of rights due to its incorporation 
via the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause,26 likewise, 
private individuals who take on the role of state actors are also 
barred from violating individuals’ constitutional rights.27  
The courts have yet to address whether the New York City 
Zoning Resolution28 places the private owner of a public plaza in 
the position of state actor through its regulations of that space.29 
This remains true in the aftermath of Waller.  In Waller, the court 
avoided the potentially treacherous task of blazing a trail of new 
jurisprudence by finding that the rules instituted by Brookfield 
Properties were reasonable restrictions even if Brookfield was 
subject to First Amendment limitations.30 This sidestepped the 
question of whether Brookfield Properties qualified as a state actor.  
                                                          
[hereinafter Public Space, Private Deed]; John Fee, The Formal State Action 
Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV. 569, 579 (2005); Kennedy, 
supra note 24, at 210. 
26 See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 209; Wayne Batchis, Free Speech in the 
Suburban and Exurban Frontier: Shopping Malls, Subdivisions, New Urbanism 
and the First Amendment, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 301, 308 (2012); Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664, 666 (1925). 
27 See, e.g., Public Space, Private Deed, supra note 25; Fee, supra note 25; 
Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated 
Towns, and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 
551–52 (2004). 
28 The New York City Zoning Resolution incentivizes the creation of 
public spaces on private land developments by granting developers who 
establish public spaces meeting the criteria of the Resolution greater 
development rights, such as leeway with height, floor-space, and setback 
restrictions. See Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Defendant at 9, People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
2012) (No. 2011NY082981). 
29 On April 30, 2012, City Councilman Ydanis Rodriguez and others filed 
suit alleging significant state action and violation of protestors’ First 
Amendment rights by Brookfield Properties and owners of other privately 
owned public spaces used by Occupy Wall Street throughout New York. 
However, the court dismissed all claims against the property owners on 
September 26, 2013, finding that the plaintiffs failed to properly allege facts 
required to establish state action. See Rodriguez v. Winski, No. 12 Civ. 
3389(NRB), 2013 WL 5379880 at *5–11, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013). 
30 Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544–45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2011). 
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Another case arising from the eviction of Occupy from 
Zuccotti Park is People v. Nunez.31 Ronnie Nunez was arrested 
with many other Occupy protestors when the N.Y.P.D. evicted 
protesters from Zuccotti Park.32 In refusing to dismiss the charges 
against Nunez, the court discusses the nature of the free speech 
claim put forth regarding their presence in Zuccotti Park.33 The 
judge recognized that “[e]ven in public [spaces], reasonable 
restrictions on time, place, or manner of protected speech may be 
imposed, provided that the restrictions are content neutral, are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and 
leave open sufficient alternative channels for communication of 
that information.”34 The Nunez court found that Nunez failed to 
demonstrate that the prohibitions on camping in the park did not 
meet the requirements of such restrictions. The court referenced 
the similarities to the situation in a United States Supreme Court 
case35 where the Court upheld a National Park Service prohibition 
on sleeping in Washington, D.C. parks as a “defensible time, place 
and manner restriction.”36 The Nunez court also concluded that 
Occupy’s presence in Zuccotti was not in itself protected speech, 
as their presence alone did not convey a particularized message.37 
Thus, while the Nunez court indicated that the restrictions imposed 
by Brookfield Properties probably would be held as reasonable 
restrictions of free speech, it likewise did not answer the question 
of whether Brookfield and other owners of privately owned public 
spaces would qualify as state actors. 
This Note answers the issue adeptly avoided by the New York 
courts in Waller and Nunez. Namely, it will establish that the 
public nature of the space and the zoning relationship between  
private owners of public plazas, like Zuccotti Park, and the 
government are too tentative to establish that the private owners 
are state actors. This is done through an analysis of the 1961 
                                                          
31 People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
32 Id. at 862. 
33 Id. at 859, 864–66. 
34 Id. at 864. 
35 Clark v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
36 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
37 Id. 
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Zoning Ordinance, its subsequent amendments, and current state 
action jurisprudence. That these private owners are not considered 
state actors will have a real impact on the countless New Yorkers 
who make daily use of the roughly eighty acres of privately owned 
public space throughout the city.38 As private actors, owners of 
privately owned public spaces do not have to consider the public’s 
constitutional rights, such as their right to free speech and 
assembly, or ensure protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, when instituting rules or regulations.39 Therefore, as more 
privately owned public spaces are developed within the city, New 
Yorkers will face a significant threat to free speech, assembly, and 
public discourse in  New York City’s public spaces.  
Part I of this Note identifies the history and development of the 
incentive zoning scheme at the heart of privately owned public 
spaces in New York City. Part II discusses the regulations and 
enforcement provisions that control the privately owned public 
spaces. Part III examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions on 
how state action relates to private entities. Part IV analyzes the 
state action doctrine, specifically how it applies to privately owned 
public spaces created through the New York City Zoning 
Resolution. This Part also argues that actions by owners of 
privately owned public spaces do not constitute state action. Part V 
concludes with a discussion of the consequences if owners of 
privately owned public spaces are not considered state actors. 
Specifically, it identifies significant long-term issues regarding free 
speech within New York City, and how the city may mitigate these 
problems by implementing changes to its Zoning Resolution. 
 
I.   HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY ZONING RESOLUTION 
 
A. Creation and Early History 
 
New York City’s first zoning ordinance dates back to 1916, 
dividing zoning districts by usage, height, and area in an effort to 
                                                          
38 Henry Grabar, A Matchmaker for New York’s Privately Owned Public 
Spaces, THE ATLANTIC CITIES (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/ 
design/2012/10/matchmaker-new-yorks-privately owned-public-spaces/3646/. 
39 Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 
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combat an explosion of skyscrapers and increasing congestion.40 In 
1960, the city adopted a major overhaul of the zoning ordinance, 
which went into effect in 1961.41 The 1961 ordinance adopted a 
system of limiting development based on zoning districts with a 
maximum floor area ratio (“FAR”): total building floor area 
divided by the total area of the lot.42 Additionally, the new 
ordinance adopted flexible regulations on heights and setback 
distances to encourage the greatest amount of “light and air, and to 
provide a general feeling of openness at street level.”43 To promote 
this public goal of openness, the ordinance created incentives for 
developers to construct publicly accessible open spaces in 
exchange for more floor area and less stringent height-to-setback 
restrictions.44 The 1961 zoning ordinance created two types of 
privately owned public spaces: plazas and arcades.45 This incentive 
                                                          
40 JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK 
CITY EXPERIENCE 7–8 (2000). 
41 Id. at 10. 
42 Id. “For a lot of 20,000 square feet, with a fifteen FAR, the basic 
maximum floor area would reach 300,000 feet.” If, for instance, a building in a 
ten FAR zone covered one hundred percent of the lot it was developed on, it 
could be ten stories tall. If it instead covered fifty percent of the lot, it could be 
twenty stories instead. Id.; see also N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS &  
RESOLUTION § 33-12 (1961), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dcp/pdf/zone/zoning_maps_and_resolution_1961.pdf. The floor area bonus 
granted from creating a public space ranged from 1.5 square feet of development 
space per square foot of public space, to ten square feet per square foot of public 
space, depending on the development’s FAR zone and the type of public space 
created, and was capped at twenty percent of the base maximum FAR allowed 
for the development. See id.; KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 11–12. 
43 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 10 (citation omitted). 
44 See id. at 11; see also N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 
42, § 81-251 (“The common purpose of these two sets of regulations is to offer 
maximum design flexibility while setting reasonable but firm standards to 
protect access of light and air to public streets and adjacent buildings.”).   
45 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 11–12. The 1961 Zoning Ordinance and 
the subsequent 1962 Amendment defined “plaza” as “[A]n open area accessible 
to the public at all times . . . [a] continuous open area along a front lot line, not 
less than 10 feet deep (measured perpendicular to the front lot line), with an area 
of not less than 750 square feet .” Id. at 11. Plazas also had restrictions relative 
to its height above or below street level, requiring that no portion of the plaza be 
located “more than five feet above not more than twelve feet below the curb 
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zoning scheme proved wildly popular with developers, as seventy 
percent of the commercial office buildings constructed in New 
York City between 1966 and 1975 provided public plazas.46 The 
financial benefit from the additional floor area was enormous when 
compared to the quality and quantity of public space received in 
return.47 Additionally, the limited requirements for a public plaza 
under the ordinance meant a developer could create an open 
concrete area and receive the full benefit of having built a usable 
public plaza.48 From 1968 to 1973, several new public space 
definitions were adopted by amendment, but unlike prior 
amendments, the New York City Planning Commission (“CPC”) 
retained discretion and was largely responsible for the granting of 
additional floor area benefits.49 As a result, developers had to 
                                                          
level of the nearest adjoining street,” and that the plaza be “unobstructed from 
its lowest level to the sky.” Id. Certain obstructions, such as trees, fountains, and 
low railings, are acceptable, so long as they obstruct less than half the street 
frontage. Id. The ordinance described “arcade” as “a continuous area open to a 
street or to a plaza, which is open and unobstructed to a height of not less than 
twelve feet . . . accessible to the public at all times . . . .” Id. at 12. 
46 Id. at 12. 
47 The development at 180 Water Street received a bonus of nearly 47,000 
square feet for creating a thin strip of public space around the footprint of the 
building totaling just over 6,000 square feet and containing no amenities. Yolane 
Almanzar & Michael Keller, The $21 Million Sidewalk: Putting a Price  
Tag on Privately Owned Public Spaces, N.Y. WORLD (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/04/05/21-million-sidewalk/. With an 
estimated value of $455 dollars per square foot, that adds roughly $21 million to 
the value of the building. Id. Other properties throughout the City have received 
added value through the City’s incentive zoning of up to $353 million. Id.; see 
also KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 89–90. 
48 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 16. There is no discretion in allotting the 
bonuses under the original 1961 Ordinance. Once developers meet the very 
minimum requirements, they are granted the zoning benefits “as-of-right.” Id. 
This likely is the reason plazas under the 1961 standard constitute roughly one 
third of all public spaces in existence today. See Privately Owned Public Space: 
History, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ 
pops/pops_history.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter POPS 
History]. 
49 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 12–13. These new public spaces added to the 
Zoning Resolution included variants on the older plaza and arcade designations, 
such as the elevated plaza, sunken plaza, and through block arcade, which as 
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submit proposals for these new types of public spaces to the CPC 
for approval.50  
 
B.  Improvements and Amendments  
 
In 1975, New York City took steps to address the clear lack of 
quality and amenities like landscaping and seating in most 
privately owned public spaces.51 The city enacted an amendment 
“imposing higher design standards, mandating functional 
amenities, and inaugurating a special administrative review 
procedure” for all future public spaces.52 As part of the new 
procedure for creating public spaces under the 1975 amendment, a 
developer needed a certification approving the design from the 
Chairperson of the CPC.53 The developer also was required to take 
out a performance bond, which the city would use to finance 
compliance with the specific requirements of the public space if 
the developer later refused to do so.54 Additionally, the developer 
was required to file a restrictive declaration55 on the property, 
                                                          
their names suggest allowed developers to create plaza’s above or below ground 
level and arcades that cut through a city block. Other new definitions added to 
the Resolution included the entirely new public space designs such as the 
covered pedestrian space, an indoor space allowing for small shops and cafes, 
and the open air concourse, which allowed for below street level outdoor areas 
that allowed convenient access to the subway. Id. 
50 Id. at 23. These new types of public spaces generally saw little use 
compared to the traditional plazas and arcades. Id. at 16. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. The 1975 amendment only applied changes to public spaces attached 
to office buildings in commercial districts, but a subsequent 1977 amendment 
applied the same changes to public spaces attached to residential buildings in 
commercial and residential districts. One difference remained: the residential 
public spaces were not subject to the same administrative certification, and were 
granted so long as they met the new, improved minimum standards. Public 
spaces were required to be southern facing, where possible, to maximize the 
amount of sunlight received, and shape restrictions were put into place to 
prevent oddly configured spaces that would be less appealing. Id. at 17. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 The DCP defines restrictive covenant as “a covenant running with the 
land that binds the present and future owners of the property. Restrictive 
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outlining the obligations agreed upon during the zoning 
certification process.56 
Since 1975 several additional amendments to the zoning 
ordinance have significantly changed the landscape of the 
incentive zoning system. In part to discourage the use of privately 
owned public spaces by the homeless, the city adopted a zoning 
amendment in 1979 authorizing owners of certain public spaces to 
close those spaces at night, with permission from the CPC, if the 
owners agreed to upgrade the quality of the space.57 A 1993 zoning 
amendment enlarged the number of privately owned public spaces 
that could close at night by agreeing to such upgrades, and a 1996 
zoning amendment gave all remaining spaces the ability to close at 
night by agreeing to upgrade their facilities.58 Moreover, the 1996 
zoning amendment ended the city’s policy of granting 
development benefits “as-of-right” for meeting the minimum 
statutory requirements for a constructed privately owned public 
space, and instead  established a new discretionary policy for all 
future public spaces.59 Under this change, rather than automatically 
receiving zoning concessions for building a privately owned public 
space that met the statutory requirements, the CPC would now 
have to approve the public space first before the developer could 
receive a development bonus.60 However, none of these regulatory 
changes applied to spaces retroactively; the older regulatory 
standards which allow for lower levels of quality and amenities 
would still govern those spaces which were developed under those 
standards unless the owner voluntarily agreed to upgrade the 
                                                          
declarations are used to implement the conditions of a land use approval or 
ensure implementation of environmental mitigations and project components.” 
Zoning Glossary, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF BLDGS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/ 
html/zone/glossary.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
56 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 17. 
57 Id. at 19. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. The website for the New York City DCP notes that these changes 
were “[i]n response to the real and perceived failure of many of these spaces and 
to community dissatisfaction with their effectiveness, the types of public spaces 
permitted, and their locations.” POPS History, supra note 48. 
60
 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 23. 
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public space to meet the current standards.61 Most recently, 
amendments adopted in 2007 and 2009 consolidate the various 
types of plazas under the ordinance into one “public plaza” 
definition, require specific design specifications for any newly 
proposed privately owned public spaces, provide new regulations 
regarding kiosks and cafes, and optional nighttime closing of the 
plaza.62 
Since New York began incentive zoning in 1961, the city has 
created more than 3.5 million square feet of privately owned public 
space63 and has produced untold millions in additional value for 
those properties.64 However, many New Yorkers question whether 
the public is truly receiving an adequate benefit for these 
concessions to developers.65 If history provides any guide, these 
concerns will continue to drive changes in incentive zoning policy, 
as New York City seeks to maximize public gain while continuing 
to encourage economic development.   
 
                                                          
61 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 19. Zuccotti Park is among those older 
parks that is regulated by the older standards in place when it was built in 1968. 
Nancy Scola, Owners of the Park and the Center of Occupy Wall Street Protests 
are Losing Patience, But What Can They Do?, CAPITAL N.Y. (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/10/3608746/owners-park-
center-occupy-wall-street-protests-are-losing-patience-. 
62 See §§ 37-70–37-78 of Public Plaza 2007 Text Amendment, N.Y.C. 
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/ 
pdf/priv/101707_final_approved_text.pdf; see also Privately Owned Public 
Plazas Text Amendment §§ 37-70–37-78 (Sept. 19, 2007), N.Y.C. DEP’T OF 
CITY PLANNING, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/pops/ 
zoning_text_proposal_2009_02_09.pdf . 
63 See POPS History, supra note 48. 
64 The value added to 180 Water Street alone by its public space is 
estimated to be more than $21 million. See Almanzar & Keller, supra note 47. 
65 See, e.g., Jerold S. Kayden, Meet Me at the Plaza, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/opinion/zuccotti-park-and-
the-private-plaza-problem.html (noting that “roughly 40 percent . . . [of public 
spaces] are practically useless, with austere designs, no amenities and little or no 
direct sunlight. Roughly half of the buildings surveyed had spaces that were 
illegally closed or otherwise privatized.”); Almanzar & Keller, supra note 47 
(comparing estimated financial gain by developer to amenities and quality of 
space received by the public). 
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II.   LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ORDINANCE 
 
The Zoning Resolution does not merely lay out the process for 
the creation of privately owned public spaces and the standards 
which they must meet; it also establishes the law affecting the 
spaces after they have been established. It does so through 
provisions establishing the city’s oversight of privately owned 
public spaces and the various mechanisms for enforcement. 
 
A. Regulatory Oversight 
  
Jerold S. Kayden,66 a leading scholar on New York’s privately 
owned public spaces, identifies the public’s right to these spaces as 
a “legally binding right[] to access and use.”67 He analogizes this 
right to “an easement held by the public on the owner’s property, 
whose extent is defined by the city’s Zoning Resolution and by 
implementing legal actions.”68 Under his analysis, the owner has 
ceded the traditional property right to exclude anyone the owner 
wants in order to receive the associated development right from the 
city.69 The burden upon the owner’s traditional property right 
varies across New York’s privately owned public spaces. There are 
different legal definitions, design requirements, and approval 
processes for the various types of public space depending on when 
the spaces were created, thus the law covering older developments 
may differ from the current standard applied to new ones.70  
                                                          
66 Jerold S. Kayden is a professor of Urban Planning and Design at the 
Harvard Kennedy School, founder of the non-profit organization, Advocates for 
Privately Owned Public Space, and a leading scholar on privately owned public 
space.  
67 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 21. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 23. 
70 Id. at 16–19. Plazas, arcades, and residential arcades built prior to 1996 
were granted “as-of-right” if they met the statutory requirements as determined 
by the City’s Department of Buildings. Discretionary approval by the CPC was 
required for several less common types of spaces (“through block arcade, 
covered pedestrian spaces, through block gallerias, elevated plazas, sunken 
plazas, and open air concourses”). Id. at 23. The final method of approval, 
certification, applies to sidewalk widenings, open air concourses, urban plazas, 
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A public space has to conform to the legal requirements and 
operations of the Zoning Resolution in effect at the time of that 
privately owned public space’s creation.71 Privately owned public 
spaces created prior to 1996, when the last major changes to the 
Zoning Resolution were passed, may differ significantly from 
newer spaces.72 However, current law governs more recently 
developed spaces, and requests to change the legal requirements of 
older spaces, if granted by the city, often bring a space under the 
current regulatory scheme.73 The CPC will require owners of older 
public spaces to accept the current improved standards for the 
space and may require the provisioning of additional amenities 
before granting the owner the right to close at night or install cafes 
or kiosks in the space.74 
The Zoning Resolution’s requirements for ongoing 
maintenance by the owner of the public space are fairly minimal.75 
The owner must keep the space open during the prescribed hours 
of access; provide specified amenities to keep the space in good 
condition; manage litter, rodents and pigeons; and care for or 
replace vegetation as needed.76 Additionally, the owner must 
maintain all landscaping and replace any damaged or dying 
landscaping at the next available planting season.77 Depending on 
the approved specifications of the public space, the owner may be 
required to provide other services, such as rent-free access to the 
space for private non-profit groups.78 
The Zoning Resolution is largely silent with regard to how the 
owner can manage the public’s use of the privately owned public 
                                                          
and post-1996 residential plazas. Although certification by the Chairperson of 
the CPC is not subject to full discretion, it does allow the Chairperson to closely 
examine a proposal for full compliance with the Zoning Resolution. Id. at 24. 
71 Id. at 25. 
72 Id. at 12–19. 
73 Id. at 39.  
74 Id. 
75  Id. at 38. 
76 Id.; N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-77. 
77 N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-93. 
78 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
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space.79 The Department of City Planning (“DCP”) set forth that 
the owners may subject the public space to “reasonable” rules and 
limitations.80 In order to define the reach of this nebulous right 
held by the owner, the DCP turned to rules applicable to the city-
owned parks as a guideline.81 In applying those rules, the DCP has 
determined that requirements that dogs be leashed, bans on 
alcohol, or prohibitions on sleep can be enforced.82 However, 
attempts to exclude particular groups of people or to set arbitrary 
time limitations on the use of the public space would be 
unreasonable.83 The undefined nature and limit of the regulatory 
power held by the owners of public spaces may allow them to limit 
the space’s use in ways not foreseen by the drafters of the Zoning 
Resolution. However, the scope of these limitations has yet to be 
fully tested. 
 
B. Enforcement Provisions 
 
Enforcement of New York City’s privately owned public 
spaces relies on a complex and ineffective system. While the city’s 
Department of Buildings (“DOB”) has sole authority for enforcing 
the Zoning Resolution, it does not regularly monitor or inspect 
privately owned public spaces.84 Instead, the DOB relies on 
complaints from the public and other municipal agencies such as 
                                                          
79 Id. However, for example, the Resolution permits the posting of a sign 
that prohibits behaviors that are not “[in]consistent with the normal public use of 
the public plaza,” such as the consumption of alcoholic beverages. N.Y.C. 
ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-752. Conversely, property 
owners may not prohibit “behaviors that are consistent with the normal public 
use of the public plaza such as lingering, eating, drinking of non-alcoholic 
beverages or gathering in small groups.” Id. 
80 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
81 Id. For rules and regulations of New York City parks, see Rules & 
Regulations, N.Y.C. PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.nycgovparks.org/ 
rules (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Parks & Recreation 
Rules]. 
82
 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 40. 
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the DCP or the CPC.85 The owner of the public space must also 
submit a compliance report to the Director of the DCP and the 
local community board every three years.86  
Once the DOB determines that a public space is not in 
compliance with its required standards, it issues a “Notice of 
Violation” to the owner, who must then “appear before an 
administrative law judge of the Environmental Control Board.”87 A 
Zoning Resolution violation constitutes a misdemeanor, which 
allows “[t]he Department of Buildings [to] pursue criminal action 
in state court to enforce the Zoning Resolution.”88 As another 
option, the city’s Corporation Counsel may seek a restraining order 
or injunction against the owner in state court to halt the violation.89 
Continued non-compliance subjects the owner to possible 
“revocation of [their] building permit or certificate of 
occupancy.”90 
In addition to judicial intervention, the city has other means of 
enforcing compliance. The city may use performance bonds taken 
out by the owners when the public space was first created to 
                                                          
85 Id. While the DCP does inspect public spaces, the inspections are 
“informal” follow-ups to public complaints, or inspections by employees acting 
“on their own initiative.” Id. 
86 N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-78(b). Failure 
to submit a compliance report constitutes a violation of the Resolution, and 
“may constitute the basis for denial or revocation of a building permit or 
certificate of occupancy, or for a revocation of such authorization or 
certification, and for all other applicable remedies.” Id. § 37-78(d). 
87 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 40. At this point, a first-time offender may 
admit and fix the violation within thirty-five days if the violation is non-
hazardous and file a certificate of correction with the Buildings Department to 
avoid penalty, or they may settle to pay a reduced penalty. If the owner contests 
the accusation of violation, a hearing is held before an Environmental Control 
Board administrative law judge, who can impose up to a $10,000 fine. A losing 
party may appeal this decision to the full Environmental Control Board, and 
after that, may bring an Article 78 action to the state court, which generally will 
only overturn the Board’s decision on a showing that it was “arbitrary and 
capricious.” Id. 
88 Id. at 41. 
89 Id. 
90 N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-78(d). 
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correct compliance failures.91 In some instances, a public space’s 
restrictive declaration even stipulates that all rents collected from 
the owner’s floor-area bonus are to be paid to the city if the owner 
is noncompliant.92 Despite the patchwork of enforcement 
mechanisms in place, the limited system of oversight reduces the 
overall effectiveness of the city’s regulation of existing privately 
owned public spaces. 
 
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads, in part, 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.93  
 However, these limitations on the power to “abridge the 
privileges or immunities,” or deny due process and equal 
protection to citizens, only apply to the states.94 The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not limit the power of private actors whose 
actions abridge the rights of citizens.95 Due to this, Congress 
passed Section 1983 of the United States Code as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 and extended civil liability to private persons 
who deprive a citizen of “any rights, privileges or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws” under the “color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia.”96 Later Supreme Court 
                                                          
91 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 41. 
92 Id. 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
94 Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private 
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 128 (2004). 
95 “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 
amendment.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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rulings held that the reference to acting “under the color of law” 
also effected private individuals held to be state actors.97 This 
means that private individuals acting under the color of law are 
bound by the same restrictions the Fourteenth Amendment places 
on the states with regard to the rights, privileges, and immunities 
of citizens.98 
To determine whether a private owner of a public plaza is 
required to respect the constitutional rights of citizens, the court 
must first decide whether or not the owner qualifies as a state 
actor.99 Unfortunately, as former U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor once commented, “our cases deciding when 
private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a 
model of consistency.”100 The Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding state action tend to be highly fact-specific, and therefore 
predicting the outcome of a state action case before the Court is not 
an easy task.101 However, the Supreme Court has recognized state 
action by private actors in a number of circumstances, notably in 
instances where the private actor (1) performs a public function,102 
                                                          
97 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 n.9 (1992) (“Although Polk 
County determined whether or not the public defender’s actions were under the 
color of state law, as opposed to whether or not they constituted state action, this 
Court subsequently has held that the two inquiries are the same . . . .”); Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 n.4 (1988) (“In this 
case the under-color-or-law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the state-
action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are equivalent.”); Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (“[I]t is clear that in a §1983 
action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action ‘under 
the color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are identical.”). 
98 Magarian, supra note 94, at 129. 
99 Id. at 128. 
100 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
101 Maloy, supra note 23, at 648. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“Only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct 
be attributed its true significance.”). 
102 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (2009); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); 
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).  
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(2) enters into a symbiotic relationship with the state,103 or (3) 
jointly participates with the state104 in depriving citizens of their 
constitutional rights.105 The three forms of “state action” are 
pertinent to understanding why owners of privately owned public 
spaces do not qualify as state actors.  
 
A. The Public Function Doctrine 
 
An actor serves a public function when it fills a role 
traditionally exclusively performed by a public entity such as a 
local or state government.106 Beginning in Marsh v. Alabama,107 
the Supreme Court began to recognize that a property owner’s 
ability to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights on the 
owner’s private land is not absolute when the land serves a public 
function.108 In Marsh, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was 
convicted of trespassing for distributing literature on the sidewalk 
of a company town owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.109 
The Supreme Court found that the town owner’s property rights 
were an insufficient grounds to allow the owner to restrict a 
citizen’s fundamental liberties.110 While the Court did not 
specifically discuss the matter in terms of state action, it noted that 
the company town functioned in the same way as any other 
municipality.111 The Court compared the sidewalks of the company 
                                                          
103 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 294 (2001). 
104  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 636–37 (1991); 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
105 See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 210. See generally Maloy, supra note 23 
(arguing that in order to impose penalties on an individual for deprivation of 
rights, there must be a connection between the individual and the sovereign). 
106 Maloy, supra note 23, at 600. 
107 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
108 Id. at 506 (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become 
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”). 
109 Id. at 503. 
110 Id. at 509. 
111 Id. at 507. 
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town with sidewalks of a traditional municipality, to make the 
argument that sidewalks, even when privately owned, serve the 
role of a traditional public space.112 If the state were to allow the 
application of the trespassing statute to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
actions in a company town, then the private owners would be able 
to abridge First Amendment rights within any privately owned 
town.113 
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court in Evans v. Newton,114 
further clarified the public function doctrine as it relates to state 
action. In Evans, a citizen bequeathed a park to the city of Macon, 
Georgia, provided that the park remained racially segregated.115 
When the city desegregated the park, members of the park’s board 
of managers sought to have the park transferred to private trustees, 
who would then follow the testator’s wish to segregate the park.116 
The Court held that the “public character of [the] park requires that 
it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”117 The Court recognized that a park 
“is more like a fire department or police department” than a “[g]olf 
club[], social center[], luncheon club[], or school[]. . .,” in that 
“[t]he service rendered even by a private park of this character is 
municipal in nature.”118 
A mere six years after Evans, the Supreme Court began 
curtailing the applicability of the public function doctrine to real 
property. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,119 the Court recognized a limit 
to the Marsh line of public function cases. In Lloyd Corp., 
protestors were threatened with arrest after hand-billing against the 
                                                          
112 Id. at 504. Traditional public spaces are those types of public spaces that 
have a long historical tradition of being publicly owned and accessible, such as 
streets, sidewalks, parks, and plazas. Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: 
Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 692 (1991).  
113 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505. 
114 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
115 Id. at 297. 
116 Id. at 297–98. 
117 Id. at 302. 
118 Id. at 301–02. 
119 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
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Vietnam War in a large shopping mall.120 In finding that the 
protestors speech was not protected in the private shopping mall, 
the Court distinguished the case from Marsh, noting that the 
company town in Marsh took on all aspects of a municipality, 
while the protestors in Lloyd Corp. only alleged that the shopping 
center serve the function of a municipal business district.121 The 
Court also distinguished Lloyd Corp. from a previous case, 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, Inc.,122 where the Court had allowed union picketing in 
front of a store within a privately owned shopping mall.123 In 
distinguishing Lloyd Corp. from Logan Valley, the Court explained 
that the picketing in Logan Valley was allowed because it was the 
only possible way for the picketers to reach their target audience, 
customers of the store where they worked.124 The protestors in 
Lloyd Corp., on the other hand, were expressing a general message 
to the public at large that could be effective in many other places, 
not merely on Lloyd Corp.’s private property.125 It should be 
recognized that neither Lloyd Corp. nor Logan Valley specifically 
reference the public function doctrine or Evans, but focus on the 
aspects of the shopping malls that resemble traditional public 
spaces. 
The Supreme Court continued to limit the right to free speech 
on privately owned but publicly accessible property. In Hudgens v. 
N.L.R.B.,126 the Supreme Court recognized “that the reasoning of 
the Court’s opinion in Lloyd Corp. cannot be squared with the 
reasoning of the Court’s opinion in Logan Valley,” and considered 
Logan Valley to be fully abrogated by Lloyd Corp.127 The facts in 
Hudgens were highly similar to those of Logan Valley; striking 
workers picketed inside a shopping mall in front of their 
                                                          
120 Id. at 555–56. 
121 Id. at 569. 
122 391 U.S. 308 (1968).  
123 Id. at 309. 
124 Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 564. 
125 Id. 
126 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
127 Id. at 518. 
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employer’s location and were threatened with arrest.128 The Court 
found that a “large self-contained,” privately owned shopping 
center did not serve the entirety of the same sort of municipal 
function as was found in Marsh, since the shopping mall lacked 
“residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers” and the other 
traditional trappings of a municipal.129 On this basis, the Court 
found the union members who were denied the ability to hand-bill 
in front of the shop that employed them within a shopping center 
had no First Amendment claim against the center’s owner.130  
In addition, the Supreme Court has applied the public function 
doctrine in other situations outside the context of real property, 
notably when private doctors are contracted by the government to 
treat patients in state prisons131 and through the use of peremptory 
challenges to strike jurors for perceived bias during jury selection 
in civil trials.132 Conversely, in several instances, the Supreme 
Court has held that a private party is not a state actor, even if a 
public entity often serves that same function. For example, in 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.133 the Court held that a 
privately owned utility, heavily regulated by the state, was not a 
state actor in part because “supplying of utility service is not 
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”134 
                                                          
128 Id. at 509. 
129 See id. at 519–21. 
130 See id. at 521. 
131 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (“The State bore an 
affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to West; [and] the State 
delegated that function to respondent Atkins . . . .”). 
132 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 52 (2009) (arguing that the 
reasons in Edmonson “apply with even greater force in the criminal context 
because the selection of a jury in a criminal case fulfills a unique and 
constitutionally compelled governmental function”); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (“The peremptory challenge is used in 
selecting an entity that is a quintessential governmental body, having no 
attributes of a private actor.”).  
133 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
134 Id. at 353. The Court also notes that the Pennsylvania courts reject the 
idea that providing utility service is a public function or duty. See id. (citing 
Baily v. City of Philadelphia, 39 A. 494 (Pa. 1898); Girard Life Ins. Co. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 7 W.N.C. 69 (Pa. 1879)). 
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Furthermore, in Blum v. Yaretsky,135 the Supreme Court noted that 
it was “unable to conclude that the nursing homes perform a 
function that has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of 
the state.’”136 The Court held that the nursing home was not a state 
actor when it moved patients to a lower care facility, and therefore, 
due process observations were not required.137  
From these cases, it is clear that Supreme Court precedent has 
construed the public function doctrine of state action narrowly. The 
Court has limited it to functions that are traditionally exclusive to 
the state, like providing healthcare to state prisoners,138 selecting 
juries,139 and providing access to public spaces of the 
municipality.140 The Evans Court’s notion that a park’s services are 
municipal in nature seems to stretch the Marsh concept of 
municipal-type public space functions to its furthest extreme. 
Indeed, as Justice Harlan’s dissent in Evans points out, prior to that 
decision, the Court had “declined to review two New York cases 
which in turn held Marsh inapplicable to a privately operated 
residential community.”141 Any further expansion of this holding 
would seem to break with the “traditionally exclusive” standard 
put forward in Jackson eight years after Evans was decided. 
Additionally, Jackson demonstrates that even a function that is 
often a matter of state governance, such as providing utility 
service, cannot be considered a public function if it is not foremost 
a state function.142 A comparison of New York’s privately owned 
public spaces and the private park in Evans demonstrates that a 
private owner’s operation of a public plaza does not constitute a 
public function. 
 
                                                          
135 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
136 Id. at 1011 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 
(1974)). 
137 See id. at 995, 1012. 
138 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).  
139 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (2009); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).  
140 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
141 Evans, 382 U.S. at 321 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
142 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). 
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B. Joint Participation 
 
Another form of state action is joint participation: when a 
private actor acts jointly or in cooperation with public officials.143 
In order to be considered state action the cooperative behavior 
must be substantial.144 The state merely regulating, even 
extensively, the challenged activity does not alone create joint 
participation in the activity.145 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority,146 the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of a 
case-by-case, fact-based analysis to determine the existence of 
state action by joint participation.147 “Only by sifting and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in 
private conduct be attributed its true significance.”148 In Burton, a 
municipal parking garage leased space to a privately operated 
coffee shop that discriminated against African-Americans.149 
Noting that the city owned and maintained the property and 
depended on the shop’s lease to keep the property profitable, the 
Court held that “[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence with [the coffee shop] that it must be 
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”150 
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Supreme Court 
identified a “nexus” test as a means of determining if the state is 
sufficiently interrelated with the private actor to constitute state 
action.151 This fact-based examination requires “a sufficiently close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action.”152 The Court 
in Blum later clarified the nexus test to require that the state should 
                                                          
143 See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941–42 (1982). 
144 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
145 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357–58. 
146 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
147 See id. at 722–26. 
148 Id. at 722. 
149 Id. at 716. 
150 Id. at 723–25. 
151 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citation 
omitted). 
152 Id. 
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be responsible for the act that is the subject of the complaint.153 
This can be evidenced through either significant encouragement or 
coercion by the state.154 In Jackson, the state of Pennsylvania 
extensively regulated Metropolitan Edison Company, and the 
utility terminated service in a manner legal under state law and 
approved by the state entity which regulates utilities.155 Still, the 
Court held that state did not specifically authorize termination.156 
The “nexus” test laid out by the Court requires a higher burden for 
proving joint participation than mere state regulation of an actor 
and lawfulness of the questioned actions. 
The Supreme Court further laid out an additional two-part test 
for finding joint participation in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
Inc.157 In Lugar, a corporate creditor, Edmondson Oil, received 
prejudgment attachment of the property of Lugar, a debtor, from a 
clerk of the state court.158 The first element of the test requires that 
“the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the State or by some rule of conduct imposed 
by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.”159 
The second element is that “the party charged with the deprivation 
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor,” either 
as a state official, or as someone whose “conduct is otherwise 
chargeable to the State.”160 The Supreme Court held that in 
“invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-
created attachment procedures,” Edmonson Oil exercised state 
                                                          
153 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
154 Id. 
155 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347, 358. 
156 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354–57 (“Approval by a state utility commission of 
such a request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its 
own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not 
transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into 
‘state action.’ At most, the Commission’s failure to overturn this practice 
amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was 
authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired.”). 
157 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
158 Id. at 925. 
159 Id. at 937. 
160 Id. 
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power by depriving Lugar of property through state officials,161 
here a court clerk and the county sheriff.162 
The Lugar two-prong test would arise again in National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian.163 In Tarkanian, the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”) suspended its head 
basketball coach to comply with National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”) policy and avoid sanctions from the 
association after an NCAA investigation determined he had 
violated several regulations.164 The coach, Jerry Tarkanian, 
claimed that the NCAA was an actor because it coerced UNLV 
into complying with its rules and regulations and fired him without 
due process.165 The Supreme Court held that while UNLV did 
perform the alleged state action, the NCAA did not jointly 
participate in that action despite all of the NCAA’s investigations 
and recommendations.166 Specifically, the Court noted that UNLV 
had options other than complying with the NCAA 
recommendations: the school could have ignored the 
recommendations and accepted further sanctions, or the school 
could have withdrawn from the NCAA.167 Therefore, Tarkanian’s 
claim failed the second prong of the Lugar test: the requirement 
that the party charged with the deprivation (the NCAA) “may be 
appropriately characterized as” a state actor.168 Since the 
relationship between UNLV and the NCAA was more adversarial 
than cooperative during the investigative process, “[t]he NCAA 
cannot be regarded as an agent [of] UNLV.”169 Likewise, by 
merely providing recommendations to one of its members (in this 
case, a state university), the NCAA did not perform actions that 
could be attributed to the state, particularly where the state entity 
(UNLV) then had the power to follow or ignore those 
                                                          
161 Id. at 924. 
162 Id. at 942. 
163 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
164 Id. at 180–81. 
165 Id. at 191–92. 
166 Id. at 195–96. 
167 Id. at 198. 
168 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). 
169 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196.  
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recommendations.170 Both the adversarial relationship that existed 
between the NCAA and the state, and the voluntary nature of the 
recommendations offered by the NCAA, demonstrate the lack of 
state action by the NCAA. 
The Supreme Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
Inc.171 identified another clear example of joint participation that 
meets the two-part test identified in Lugar. In Edmonson, the Court 
found that a civil defendant who used racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenges performed a public function and jointly 
participated in state action.172 A peremptory challenge is a right the 
state grants, and here the exercise of the peremptory challenge 
caused the deprivation.173 This clearly meets the first prong of the 
test laid out in Lugar, which requires that the challenged act be the 
result of a right, privilege, or rule created by the state. “[W]ithout 
the overt, significant participation of the government, the 
peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury trial system of 
which it is a part, simply could not exist.”174 As such, even when a 
private party in a jury trial exercises the peremptory challenge, this 
action is only given force when the judge, a quintessential state 
actor, dismisses the juror. This procedure closely mirrors the use of 
the county clerk and county sheriff in Lugar’s attachment 
procedure to deprive an individual of their constitutional rights, 
and thus meets the second prong of the Lugar test for joint 
participation. That the state “delegates some portion of this power 
to private litigants does not change the governmental character” of 
peremptory challenges.175 
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to find joint 
participation in state action where the nexus between the private 
actor and the state was limited to public funding and regulation of 
the actor. In Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court did not find joint 
participation in state action between the nursing home, which 
moved patients to a facility that offered a lower level of care, and 
                                                          
170 Id. at 194–95. 
171 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
172 Id. at 622. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 626. 
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the state, despite heavy state regulation, state subsidies, and 
significant state funding.176  The first prong of the Lugar test177 
was not met since the Court did not find that the exercise of a right, 
privilege, or rule of conduct promulgated by the state caused the 
nursing home’s challenged deprivation of rights.178 This was 
demonstrated by the fact that no state regulation deprived the 
patients of their higher level care or required the nursing home to 
deprive them of such care.179 
Likewise, in a similar case decided the same year, Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn,180 the Supreme Court held that the state’s mere 
regulation and public funding of a school did not make the 
school’s decision to discharge several teachers state action.181 In 
Rendell-Baker, the state regulated and funded a school for 
maladjusted students in a manner similar to the regulation and 
funding of the nursing home in Blum.182 The Court in Rendell-
Baker, making a comparison to Blum, found that the regulations 
and receipt of public funding did not make the school’s decision to 
discharge several teachers state action.183 Justice Warren Burger 
articulated the position of the Court, stating that “[a]cts of such 
private contractors do not become acts of the government by 
reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing 
public contracts.”184 The Court in Rendell-Baker, similar to in 
Blum, held that where the exercise of a right, privilege, or 
regulation imposed by the state did not cause the nursing home to 
move patients to a lesser facility, the state did not cause the issue, 
                                                          
176 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005, 1011 (1982). The state paid for 
roughly ninety percent of the facility’s patients. Id. 
177 Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 939. 
178  Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007–10. 
179  Id. 
180 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
181 Id. at 841–42. 
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and ninety-nine percent of the school’s funding, and the school was required to 
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183 Id. at 841–42. 
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here the discharge of the teachers.185 The application of the Lugar 
test should demonstrate that New York City’s regulatory 
relationship with public plazas does not establish state action, via 
joint participation, where the private owners deprive the public of 
their rights. 
 
C. Entwinement 
 
Another way that state action can be found is through pervasive 
entwinement between a private actor and the state.186 This requires 
that the entwinement be truly substantial, almost overwhelmingly 
so.187 The first Supreme Court decision to explicitly recognize state 
action by means of entwinement was Brentwood Acad. v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.188 The Court found 
that a statewide high school athletic association was a state actor 
where (1) eighty-four percent of its more than 300-member schools 
were public institutions; (2) representatives drawn from its member 
schools conducted its administration; and (3) its employees were 
eligible for membership under the state’s retirement system.189 
Although the Court’s opinion in Brentwood did not expressly 
define “entwinement,” it relied on Evans, which held that “the 
municipality remain[ed] entwined in the management [and] control 
of the park” even after the city transferred the park to private 
trustees.190 The Evans concept of entwinement, which was never 
fully distinguished from the broader discussion of the public 
function of the park, relied largely on the significance of the park 
for city activities, the city’s continued maintenance of the park, and 
the sense of “momentum” the park had acquired under its previous 
municipal ownership.191 In Brentwood, the Court expanded on this 
concept of entwinement by noting that “the nominally private 
                                                          
185 Id. 
186 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 296 (2001). 
187 Id. at 302. 
188 Id. at 300. 
189 Id.  
190 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966). 
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character of the Association” was outweighed by the tremendous 
amount of control state officials had over the management and 
control of the agency.192 Regarding the ostensibly private nature of 
the association, the Court stated that “[t]here would be no 
recognizable association, legal or tangible, without the public 
school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly 
perform all but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association 
exists and functions in practical terms.”193 
 Since Brentwood, the Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue 
of state action by pervasive entwinement. The lower courts have, 
however, applied entwinement in a variety of instances, usually 
finding state action through entwinement in otherwise private 
administrative agencies.194 Whether or not privately owned public 
spaces are sufficiently entwined with the city of New York will 
depend largely on to what degree state and city regulations, 
officials, or agencies control the affairs of those spaces. Examining 
                                                          
192 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296, 298. The Association’s 345 
members, 290 of which were public schools, were represented by their 
principals or appointed faculty, who vote to select other school officials to serve 
as members of the board of control and legislative council. Id. at 299. 
193 Id. at 300. 
194 See Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 
483 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that association was a state actor where 
ninety-eight percent of its members were public schools, and all of the 
association’s directors were public school officials); Horvath v. Westport 
Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding a library was a state actor 
when it terminated employment, the state legislature created the library, the 
town appointed half of the governing board of trustees was appointed, and 
ninety percent of the library’s funding came from the town); Hughes v. Region 
VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the state 
was pervasively entwined with corporation’s management and control, given 
that state’s rules dictated what AAAs could and could not do, counties and cities 
were sole members of the corporation and appointed its board, and state 
approval was required for virtually every act of corporation). But see Logiodice 
v. Trustees of Maine Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002) (private high school 
operating high school for school district was not so entwined with the 
government as to be a state actor when it disciplined students, where there were 
some regulatory, budgetary, and administrative connections to the state, but the 
school was run by private trustees who had sole right to create and enforce all 
rules and regulations relating to student discipline).  
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the administrative relationship the city has with privately owned 
public spaces will demonstrate that the city is not impermissibly 
entwined with the private owners of those spaces. 
 
D. Pruneyard and State Constitutional Rights 
 
One last wrinkle in the Supreme Court’s approach to the public 
function of otherwise private property bears relevance to the 
discussion of public function. In 1980, the Supreme Court in 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,195 affirmed a California 
Supreme Court case196 that held that private owners of shopping 
malls must allow free speech activities on their property, subject to 
reasonable time and manner restrictions.197 The U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that state constitutions may grant individuals 
more rights than they would have under the U.S. Constitution 
alone.198 Thus, the California court could rightfully find that the 
state constitution’s protections of free speech extended beyond 
those in the U.S. Constitution.199  
In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court addressed one 
of the challenges put forth by the shopping mall owner; that the 
state constitution’s limitation of their right to exclude individuals 
from their property constituted a taking without just compensation 
under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.200 The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the government from taking private property 
for public use without providing just compensation.201 The Court 
notes that “not every destruction or injury to property by 
governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the 
constitutional sense,” and that an unlawful taking occurs only 
where the “restriction on private property ‘forc[es] some people 
                                                          
195 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
196 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff’d sub 
nom., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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198 Id. at 81. 
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200 Id. at 82. 
201 “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.’”202 The Court found no 
merit in the claim that the California Constitution’s free speech 
protections constituted an unlawful taking, noting that the 
shopping mall was already open to the public, and the free speech 
activity would not unreasonably burden the mall’s use or value.203 
The Court also reaffirmed that the private owners could still 
impose time, place, and manner restrictions on speech within the 
mall, ensuring property owners still retain a significant degree of 
control over speech on their property.204 Balancing the slight 
burden on the owner with the speaker’s right to free speech under 
the state constitution, “the Court deemed that no taking had 
occurred.”205 
 It should be noted that California’s approach to interpreting its 
state constitution in Pruneyard is in the minority among states; 
only New Jersey, Colorado, and Massachusetts have followed suit 
to any degree.206 New York, the only state relevant for this 
analysis, has specifically rejected finding a greater right to speech 
in the New York state constitution.207 As such, Pruneyard has no 
bearing on the issues of state action and free speech in New York 
city’s privately owned public spaces. 
 
  
                                                          
202 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 82 (quoting Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960)). 
203 Id. at 83–84. 
204 Mulligan, supra note 27, at 551–52. Some of the wide ranging 
restrictions allowed by the Court include allowing the shopping mall to establish 
designated free speech zones within the mall, setting blackout periods during the 
busy holiday season from Thanksgiving until New Year’s day, requiring prior 
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205 Berger, supra note 112, at 678. 
206 Kevin Francis O’Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 
LOY. L. REV. 411, 455 (1996). 
207 SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (N.Y. 
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IV. STATE ACTION AS IT RELATES TO NEW YORK CITY’S 
PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACES 
   
 The system of incentive zoning that the New York City Zoning 
Resolution uses differs significantly from the relationships 
explored in the previous cases. However, by applying the various 
state action doctrines to the specific factual situation of New 
York’s privately owned public spaces, it becomes clear that owners 
of those spaces are not state actors when they regulate public use 
of those spaces.  
 
A. Application of Public Function Doctrine to Privately 
Owned Public Spaces 
 
The privately owned public spaces of New York City do not 
perform a public function and therefore the actions of their private 
owners cannot be considered state action. Public plazas and other 
privately owned public spaces are largely analogous to the 
traditional public park, but there are some differences. While the 
Court in Evans recognized that parks fulfill a public function, 
much like a police department or fire department,208 privately 
owned public spaces do not fulfill that same public function.  
Unlike traditional parks, privately owned public spaces usually 
constitute a small portion of a much larger development, sharing a 
plot of land with the building which receives the zoning benefits 
resulting from the addition of the public space.209 Examples of 
privately owned public spaces that stand wholly separate from the 
development they grant zoning benefits to, as Zuccotti Park does, 
are exceptionally rare.210 As Zuccotti Park is one of the only such 
fully separate spaces created as a result of the Zoning Resolution’s 
incentive zoning scheme, this variation from the general nature of 
privately owned public spaces should not matter for the purposes 
of this state action analysis.211 Additionally, whereas the design of 
                                                          
208 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966). 
209 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 75–300 (illustrating plots in New York 
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210 See id. 
211 Uniquely, Zucotti Park at 1 Liberty Plaza is separated from its host 
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traditional public parks usually serves recreational and social 
functions as a destination for the public, many privately owned 
public spaces serve a much more passive role in society.212 These 
differences highlight the contrasting functions that privately owned 
public spaces serve compared to traditional parks.  
In Evans, many facts specific to that case strengthen the 
recognition that there is a general municipal nature for traditional 
parks. For example, the private park was under the custodianship 
of the city of Macon, and served as a center of the city’s 
community activities for years.213 According to New York City 
DCP’s own website, approximately fifteen of the city’s more than 
500 privately owned public spaces qualify as a “destination” that 
attracts significant community use.214 Evans recognized the public 
nature of mass recreation in parks, a feature noticeably lacking 
from most privately owned public spaces.215 As mentioned above, 
the size, design, and location of most privately owned public 
spaces do not suit mass recreation in the same manner traditional 
parks do.216 Additionally, city officials maintained the park in 
Evans, and it qualified as tax-exempt under state law.217  Privately 
owned public spaces do not share these features. Despite 
recognizing the municipal character of parks in general, the Evans 
finding that the park serves a public function seems limited to the 
facts of the case. The holding of Evans can be read as to 
specifically limit the Court’s finding of public function to the 
specific park at hand. The Court states that “the public character of 
                                                          
building by Liberty Street, giving it the impression of a standalone public space. 
Id. at 101. 
212 See Privately Owned Public Spaces: POPS Report Wrapup, THE BRIAN 
LEHRER SHOW (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/2011/nov/ 
09/privately owned-public-spaces-pops-report-wrapup/ [hereinafter THE BRIAN 
LEHRER SHOW]; KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 1 (“Many spaces are nothing more 
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sterile” and “completely unusable in any functional sense.” Id. at 52, 16. 
213 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301. 
214 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 51. 
215 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (citation omitted). 
216 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
217 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301. 
468 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
this park requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to 
the command of the Fourteenth Amendment.”218 The lack of facts 
supporting the holding in Evans tends to show that New York’s 
privately owned public spaces do not fulfill the same public 
function as the park in Evans. Therefore, the private owners of 
such spaces cannot be considered state actors. 
Another basis for concluding that private owners of New 
York’s public spaces are not fulfilling a public function lies in the 
Supreme Court’s limited application of the public function 
doctrine. After all, the Court has strongly limited the scope of 
Evans in the subsequent cases of Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens.219 
Moreover, since Evans, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
the rights of private owners to restrict speech on the publicly 
accessible areas of their private property. In Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. 
Tanner, the Court held that the publicly accessible walkways and 
sidewalks within a private shopping center were not public and 
thus the owner could restrict Vietnam War protestors from hand-
billing on them.220 Several years later, the Court once again visited 
the issue of speech on private property that seems to serve the 
public in Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., where it strongly affirmed Lloyd 
Corp. in holding that employees had no First Amendment right to 
picket a retail location within a shopping mall.221 The Court held 
that the mere fact that the employees in Hudgens sought to use 
their speech to draw attention to their labor strike rather than hand-
bill against the Vietnam War did not change the fact that the 
shopping mall was not public and therefore the owner could 
restrict their picketing.222 These cases demonstrate the Court’s 
                                                          
218 Id. at 302 (emphasis added). 
219 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 
U.S. 507 (1976). 
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clear reluctance to abrogate private owners’ property rights to 
restrict speech on their property even when it is regarding publicly 
accessible areas of commercial properties.  
The vast majority of New York City’s privately owned public 
spaces are directly adjacent to, surrounding, or within otherwise 
commercial properties,223 and thus present easy comparisons to the 
publicly accessible spaces of the shopping centers in Hudgens and 
Lloyd Corp. In light of these similarities, it seems unlikely the New 
York courts would split hairs to distinguish between the two types 
of properties. Therefore, the courts would likely not find that 
privately owned public spaces serve a public function. Such a 
decision would follow Supreme Court precedent for protecting 
private sovereignty even where the property in question serves the 
public in a manner similar to a traditional public forum.224 
 
B. Application of Joint Participation Doctrine to Privately 
Owned Public Spaces 
 
New York City’s privately owned public spaces lack the 
substantially cooperative relationship with state actors required to 
impute state action to the private property owner. Mere regulation 
of public spaces through the Zoning Resolution is not enough on 
its own to create joint participation, even where the regulation is 
extensive and detailed.225 Despite the detailed requirements for the 
                                                          
that where union organizers have access to the employees by other means, the 
store owner did not have to allow them access on private store property); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 
(1978) (holding that the arguably protected character of union’s picketing did 
not provide sufficient justification for preemption of state court’s jurisdiction 
over employer’s trespass claim); Cent. Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., 407 U.S. 529 
(1972) (holding that the fact that the parking lot of employer was open to the 
public did not bring union’s solicitation of employees in employer’s parking lot 
to sign union authorization card within the protection of the First Amendment). 
223 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 75–300. Some privately owned public 
spaces are associated with residential properties, but even these properties often 
serve the business interests of the property owner, serving as driveways or 
loading docks for the property.  See id. at 16. 
224 O’Neill, supra note 206, at 203. 
225 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (“The mere 
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creation and subsequent management of privately owned public 
spaces in the New York City Zoning Resolution,226 and the varied 
means of enforcing those requirements,227 such regulations alone 
also fall short of meeting the two-pronged test set out in Lugar.228 
A more direct “nexus” is required to show that the private owner 
actually acted in a manner where its actions “may be fairly treated 
as that of the State itself.”229 Application of the Lugar test to 
privately owned public spaces indicates that First Amendment 
restrictions by the owners of such spaces fails to satisfy either 
prong of the Lugar test.  
First, no right, privilege, or rule created by the state or any of 
its agents caused the restriction of First Amendment rights in 
Zuccotti Park. Unlike the prejudgment attachment of debtor’s 
property in Lugar, or the peremptory challenge to potential jurors 
during jury selection in Edmonson, the owner of a privately owned 
public space who prohibits protests or other free speech activity is 
not exercising a public right established by state law. Instead those 
owners are merely exercising their right to exclude, which is a 
private right related to their ownership of the property.230 The state 
did not endow the owners of privately owned public spaces with 
any rights beyond those which any other private property owner 
                                                          
fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its 
action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor 
does the fact that the regulation is extensive and detailed . . . do so.”). 
226 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 11–40; N.Y.C. ZONING MAPS & 
RESOLUTION, supra note 42, § 37-77. 
227 Jill Colvin, Occupy Wall Street Puts Spotlight on Privately Owned 
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229 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. 
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Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 39 (2000) (discussing case law surrounding the right to exclude). 
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may exercise. The state merely recognized their right to exclude, a 
cornerstone of the traditional bundle of property rights.231 The state 
does impose additional rules on owners of the public spaces 
regarding the use of their property by the public, notably the 
requirement that any use restrictions implemented by the property 
owners must be “reasonable.”232 However, these rules do not 
constitute a deprivation of access and use of the property by the 
public. Rather, the rules restrict the owner’s ability to exclude, an 
exercise of power owners of public spaces otherwise would be free 
to use to deprive the public of free speech on their property. 
Without the “reasonableness” rule, as nebulous and undefined as it 
is, there would be nothing to keep the private owner of a public 
space from instituting clearly unreasonable restrictions to use of 
the space, such as arbitrary restrictions on who could use the park 
or for how long.233 
Second, the private property owner of Zuccotti Park who limits 
free speech on her land is neither a state official nor someone 
whose actions may be attributed to the state without more 
significant encouragement or coercion by the state.234 Despite the 
Zoning Resolution, the state does not coerce or incentivize a 
private owner to exclude free speech, nor is the private owner 
doing so on behalf of the state. If anything, the limitation the 
Zoning Resolution places on the property owners to impose only 
“reasonable”235 use rules and limitations conflicts with the owner’s 
right to limit use of the property by the public. In that regard, as in 
Tarkanian, the state is more an antagonist to the aims and actions 
                                                          
231 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
(1982). 
232 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
233 Although the true extent of what constitutes a “reasonable” restriction of 
privately owned public space has not been specifically defined by either the 
DCP or the courts, I use these two examples which would be prohibited under 
the rules and regulations of city-owned parks, which the DCP uses as a guideline 
for determining what constitutes a reasonable restriction. See N.Y.C. City Parks 
& Recreation Rules, supra note 81. 
234 See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).  
235 See N.Y.C. Parks & Recreation Rules, supra note 81. 
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of the private actor than a joint participant in them.236 
 
C. Application of Entwinement Doctrine to Privately Owned 
Public Space 
 
Entwinement creates state action in a private actor where the 
entwinement between the private actor and the state is so pervasive 
that the state wields substantial management and control powers 
over the private entity.237 New York City’s privately owned public 
spaces fail to meet that degree of entwinement, and thus actions by 
the owners of these spaces to limit free speech do not constitute 
state action under the entwinement theory.  
Unlike in Brentwood, where a significant majority of the 
decision-making authority was in the hands of state employees and 
officials,238 managerial authority of privately owned public spaces 
remains primarily in the hands of the private owners.239 While the 
various zoning regulations in the New York City Zoning 
Resolution may limit the full scope of an owner’s control over 
their property decisions to some degree, those regulations are not 
nearly extensive or pervasive enough to establish state action. The 
requirements for public spaces to provide certain amenities and 
ongoing maintenance of spaces still require the owner’s approval 
at the time the original agreement is signed. Thus, any enforcement 
provision relating to the zoning agreement is in a sense more a 
matter of holding the private actor to their prior managerial 
decisions than the state usurping the power to make those 
decisions. Since almost all management and control of privately 
owned public spaces remains with the owner, there is no 
significant entwinement between public spaces and the state.  
 
  
                                                          
236 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 196 
(1988). 
237 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 296 (2001). 
238 Id. at 300. 
239 KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
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D. Rodriguez v. Winski 
 
On September 26, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in Rodriguez v. Winski240 granted 
motions to dismiss by Brookfield Properties and two other owners 
of property in New York City in the section 1983 suit by City 
Councilman Ydanis Rodriguez and sixteen other plaintiffs.241 The 
“[p]laintiffs assert[ed] [forty-nine] separate causes of action” 
relating to violations of their state and federal constitutional rights, 
and violations of state tort law.242 “To [prevail against] a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim [under federal rule of civil 
procedure 12(b)(6)], the plaintiff's ‘[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”243 
The court considered the allegations of joint action among the 
property owners and the N.Y.P.D., but rejected them, noting that 
nothing alleged in the complaint suggested the “substitution of 
private judgment for police judgment necessary to constitute joint 
action.”244 The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ contention that 
Evans is relevant in the instant case by recognizing that Evans has 
been limited in scope by subsequent cases, and asserting that the 
plaintiff’s failed to allege the city was involved “in any way in 
controlling or maintaining” the properties in question.245 As 
described in detail above, the city is involved in the control and 
maintenance of the spaces through the oversight and enforcement 
provisions of the incentive zoning scheme. This, among other 
aspects of the opinion, tends to indicate that Rodriguez is more a 
condemnation of the plaintiff’s poorly drafted complaint than a 
decision based on the merits of the plaintiff’s state action claims. 
                                                          
240 Rodriguez v. Winski, No. 12 Civ. 3389(NRB), 2013 WL 5379880 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013). 
241 Id. at *1. One of the other owners, J.P. Morgan Chase, was not the 
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other, Mitsui Fudosan America, was. Id. 
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243 Id. at *5 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)). 
244 Id. at *9. 
245 Id. at *10. 
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Still, the Rodriguez dismissals lend support to the conclusion that 
activity in New York’s privately owned public spaces cannot 
constitute valid state action claims against those property owners. 
 
V. PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE WITHOUT STATE ACTION 
 
A. How the “Reasonable Limitation” Standard Fails to 
Protect Free Speech 
 
If the private owners of New York City’s privately owned 
public spaces are not found to be state actors, then there is no 
guarantee of constitutional protection for public free speech within 
those spaces.246 Instead, the only protection for the public’s right to 
free speech within the privately owned public space is a rather 
nebulous and imprecise requirement that any rule or restriction 
imposed on public use by the property owner be “reasonable.”247 
This simplistic restriction on the otherwise unlimited power of the 
private owners to exclude the public at will fails to provide 
sufficient protection of the public’s right to free speech.  
Since the DCP turns to the rules implemented by the New York 
Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”) as a guideline for 
what is considered a “reasonable” restriction, the prohibitions on 
tents and sleeping are likely “reasonable.”248 However, other 
regulations, such as limitations on backpacks and security 
checkpoints, far exceed any restrictions imposed by the DPR on 
city-owned parks and therefore are likely unreasonably 
burdensome to the public under this guideline.249 The construction 
of a security fence and security checkpoints to coincide with every 
major political action planned by Occupy Wall Street demonstrates 
a clear pattern of intentionally discouraging political activity 
within Zuccotti Park. Yet, despite the implementation of numerous 
rules and regulations which disrupted and discouraged the use of 
the space by the protestors, DOB inspectors found no problems 
                                                          
246 Magarian, supra note 94, at 128. 
247 See KAYDEN, supra note 40, at 38. 
248 See N.Y.C. Parks & Recreation Rules, supra note 81. 
249 See id. 
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with the operation of Zuccotti Park.250 That such discouragement is 
permissible demonstrates that the current requirement that rules 
and regulations of privately owned public spaces be “reasonable” 
does not provide enough protection to the public’s free speech and 
assembly rights. 
 
B. The Long-Term Threat to Free Speech in New York and 
Elsewhere 
 
Without proper protection within privately owned public 
spaces, the future of all public speech in New York City faces a 
serious threat. As New York continues to become more densely 
populated,251 space in the city will continue to be a highly valuable 
commodity. This will further incentivize developers to create 
privately owned public spaces to receive the additional 
development benefits. Additionally, privately owned public space 
will likely increase as the city continues to provide increased 
public services with limited public funding.252 Meanwhile, over the 
last forty years New York City has continually reduced the budget 
of the DPR.253 “In 1960 parks maintenance and operations claimed 
1.4 percent of city funds,”254 and by 2010, that percentage had 
                                                          
250 See Salazaar, supra note 13. 
251 See New York City Population Projections, 2000–2030, DEP’T OF CITY 
PLANNING (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/ 
census/projections_briefing_booklet.pdf. 
252 See, e.g., Allison Kilkenny, N.Y.C. Bus Strike Kicks Off to Fight 
Privatization of Yellow Buses, THE NATION (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/blog/172222/nyc-bus-strike-kicks-fight-privatization-
yellow-buses# (discussing the reduced financial costs of the City’s efforts to 
privatize school busing); Laura Vanderkam, Parks and Re-Creation, CITY J. 
(2011), http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_3_ny-parks.html (describing 
efforts to improve New York’s park system through private capital rather than 
public funds).  
253 See Mission, N.Y.C. PARK ADVOCATES, http://nycparkadvocates.org/ 
mission (last visited Dec. 1, 2012). 
254 Patrick Arden, Issue 27 Preview: The High Cost of Free Parks, NEXT 
AM. CITY (June 16, 2010), http://americancity.org/daily/entry/issue-27-preview-
the-high-cost-of-free-parks. 
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been budgeted to drop to approximately 0.37 percent.255 The 
budget for 2013 alone shows a twenty percent reduction in park 
spending from the 2012 fiscal year, with more than $65 million 
less allocated to the DPR.256 
New York City has increasingly turned to privatization of 
traditional public parks to avoid allocating public funds.257 Since 
the Central Park Conservancy was founded in 1980, privatization 
efforts have involved many of New York’s more prominent public 
parks, such as the Madison Square Park Conservancy, Friends of 
the High Line, and the Bryant Park Corporation.258 Around 900 of 
New York City’s parks and playgrounds, amounting to roughly 
half of such spaces in the city, rely at least partly on private funds 
to operate.259 This trend of privatization of public services extends 
beyond the realm of public parks to many other public services260 
and will continue to be a driving force behind the approval and 
development of more privately owned public spaces in the city.  
 As private owners create more privately owned public 
spaces, such spaces will serve a growing role in New York’s 
system of public space. Without constitutional protections, the 
increase in the number of public spaces threatens to undermine 
                                                          
255 See id. (suggesting that budget cuts would lower funding for parks 
maintenance and operations to 0.37 percent of city funds). 
256 See Hearing on the Fiscal 2013 Executive Budget, DEP’T OF PARKS & 
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meters-citytime-profit-margin (discussing the privatization of the City’s public 
parking services); Aaron Short, Privatizing New York City, CITY & STATE (Aug. 
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New Yorkers traditional access to forums that allow unfettered 
freedom of speech. If some public spaces protect and allow for free 
speech and assembly, and others do not, at some point the public 
will be unable to distinguish between the two. 
 This problem extends beyond New York City as well. Other 
American cities have emulated New York City’s incentive zoning 
scheme and have created similar public spaces which also suffer 
from the same concerns regarding free speech and the right to 
assemble. Two of the more prominent examples of similar 
incentive zoning plans are in San Francisco and Seattle. In San 
Francisco, a series of sixty-six privately owned public spaces of 
varying sizes dot the downtown area.261 Since 1966, Seattle has 
also had a program for creating privately owned public space, and 
currently downtown Seattle has over sixty privately owned public 
spaces.262 Both these cities, as well as others that incentivize 
privately owned public space, will face the same long-term 
complications regarding public speech as those faced in New York. 
Unless the cities implement changes, the disparity between the 
rights in privately owned public space and the rights in publicly 
owned space will erode citizens’ confidence as to what rights they 
are free to exercise and where they may do so. 
 
C. Potential Solutions 
 
The simplest method to address freedom of speech concerns in 
privately owned public spaces would be for the city to amend its 
zoning regulations to include protections of the public’s right to 
free speech, assembly, and political activity within those spaces. 
There are two potential ways to insert this sort of protection into 
the existing zoning regulations: (1) include a clarification of what 
                                                          
261 Secrets of San Francisco: A Guide to San Francisco’s Privately owned 
Public Open Spaces, S.F. PLANNING & URBAN RESEARCH ASS’N., available at 
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restrictions are “reasonable” under the existing standards; or (2) 
include a separate provision to the Zoning Resolution that requires 
private owners creating public spaces to agree to allow certain 
speech-related activities. 
Clarifying the meaning of “reasonable restrictions” in the New 
York City Zoning Resolution would impose that new interpretation 
on all privately owned public spaces established prior to such an 
amendment, as well as all future public spaces created under the 
incentive zoning scheme. However, this could raise issues with 
regard to the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.263 It could be seen 
as unilaterally restricting an owner’s right to exclude others from 
their property without providing just compensation as required by 
the Fifth Amendment.264 Although “[t]he power to exclude has 
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in 
an owner’s bundle of property rights,” as the Court noted in 
Pruneyard, not all destructions of property rights are unlawful 
takings.265 The Court, in two cases where an unlawful taking was 
found after Pruneyard was decided, has shed some light on how 
the Court might approach New York City, imposing clearer 
guidelines regarding what sort of reasonable restrictions an owner 
of a privately owned public space may impose.266 In Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.267 and Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,268 the Court noted that the regulations that 
caused entry onto the private land created permanent physical 
invasions of the private land.269 On the other hand, in Pruneyard, 
                                                          
263 “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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“the invasion was temporary and limited in nature”270 and “would 
not result in the public gaining ‘permanent access’ to the shopping 
center.”271 It is also worth noting that both the apartment building 
in Loretto and the beach in Nollan were not willingly opened to the 
public at large, while the shopping mall in Pruneyard, much like 
New York’s privately owned public spaces, invite the public onto 
the property.272 As such, New York City’s limiting of the types of 
restrictions the owners of privately owned public spaces may use 
would impose a minimal burden on the property rights of the 
owner and would likely withstand legal challenge by the owners. 
An alternative approach to protecting the rights of the public 
would be to amend the Zoning Resolution so that any proposal by 
a developer to create a new privately owned public space would 
require the owner to acknowledge and respect the speech and 
assembly rights of the public. This amendment to the Zoning 
Resolution would address the problem of ensuring the public’s 
right to use these spaces as a public forum, while providing some 
flexibility to the city. For instance, while most privately owned 
public spaces are accessible to the public twenty-four hours a day, 
the city may have some reservations about allowing political rallies 
at 3:00 A.M. on a Tuesday morning. As it stands, all of New 
York’s publicly owned parks close at night,273 and large gatherings 
require permits.274 The city could impose similar restrictions to 
privately owned public spaces. Also, while this solution would 
only provide constitutional protection to newly developed spaces, 
the city could institute a system similar to the current system used 
to improve the quality of older spaces. The current system requires 
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the owner, in exchange for concessions allowing him or her to 
close the space at night, to upgrade the features of the space to the 
most current standards for privately owned public space 
development.275 An added requirement for private owners to be 
compliant with the most current standards could include an 
agreement to have to agree to a free speech protection clause. This 
would allow the city to expand freedom of speech protection to 
public spaces already in existence.  
Creating additional protections for free speech provides a 
major benefit to the public while imposing a relatively minor 
burden on the owners of privately owned public spaces. The 
creation of such public spaces remains extremely profitable for 
private owners,276 and it is unlikely that this additional burden 
would dissuade potential developers. New York City would also 
still be able to achieve its goal of incentivizing private 
development of public space, while at the same time protecting 
public space’s traditional role as a public forum. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Courts are not likely to find that owners of privately owned 
public spaces created under the New York City Zoning Resolution 
are state actors. Therefore, owners are able to restrict free speech 
on their property. This poses serious, ongoing complications for 
the public’s right to express themselves in New York public 
spaces. To correct this problem, the city could amend or clarify the 
Zoning Resolution to provide for specific protections to the 
public’s speech and assembly rights within privately owned public 
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spaces. These changes would more thoroughly reflect the principle 
that free speech is a fundamental characteristic of traditional public 
space and a core value of New York City. 
